Iraqgate: Saddam Hussein, U.S. Policy
And the Prelude to the Persian Gulf War, 1980-1994
Friends in Deed: The United States and Iraq Before the Persian Gulf War
Friday 22nd April 2005 (04h05) :

The scandal that came to be called "Iraqgate" first attracted widespread public attention in 1990, in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Persian Gulf war. The invasion followed a decade in which two successive U.S. administrations had viewed improvement of U.S.-Iraq relations as an important tenet of U.S. foreign policy, and had engaged in extensive trade with that country in pursuit of that goal. The policy had been adopted at least in part as a way to increase influence with Iraq. The fact that it failed to deter the invasion of Kuwait led to congressional and media criticism, including allegations that the U.S. had contributed, chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs. These were not accusations that the Bush administration was pleased to confront as U.S. and allied troops faced Iraqi forces in the Persian Gulf region, nor after the war, when the White House would have preferred to savor a military victory which, it hoped, would be perceived as a great foreign policy success.

The full range of Iraqgate allegations involves a complex cast of characters and an intricate and intertwining succession of events. The personages involved include an international array of arms dealers, bankers, merchants, lawyers, military officers, foreign agents, and government officials. It is impossible to describe the affair in brief: therefore, only a few key elements of the story will be discussed here.

Economic Assistance Programs and Exports to Iraq

In 1982, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the State Department’s list of countries regarded as supporters of international terrorism (despite doubts that Iraq had created its relationships with terrorist groups). This action eliminated legal restrictions that would otherwise have prevented Iraq from receiving credit guarantees from the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), enabling it to obtain credit for the purchase of U.S. products and technology. Eximbank began to provide short-term cover to Iraq in 1985. In December 1982, the Agriculture Department (USDA) authorized Iraq’s participation in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) export credit guarantee programs. (These programs were set up to help expand the U.S. agriculture market, by offering credit to countries otherwise lacking in sufficient resources to import U.S. commodities.) The authorization enabled Iraq to obtain financing to import U.S. food products, a significant benefit for a country that experienced growing financial difficulties throughout the 1980s, and encountered increasing problems in obtaining credit from private banks.

Iraq’s economic difficulties resulted in part from its commitment to intensive and expensive civilian and military industrialization programs, a commitment which was maintained throughout and after the war with Iran (1980-1988). To support these programs, it was most interested in obtaining western technology, and was therefore eager to expand trade with the U.S. The U.S. government, fully aware that Iraq had active programs in the areas of chemical and biological warfare and missile development, was concerned about providing it with U.S. technology. (Available documents seem to reflect some disagreement regarding the aggressiveness of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programs, and the level of sophistication of these efforts.) The U.S. had a system of export controls and an export review policy intended to prevent countries like Iraq from obtaining technology useful for nonconventional weapons programs. In addition, the official U.S. policy of neutrality disallowed the export of weapons to either protagonist in the Iran-Iraq war (a policy not always followed, as the Reagan administration’s attempts to exchange weapons with Iran in return for American hostages in Lebanon demonstrated).

Nevertheless, a great deal of dual-use equipment and technology made its way to Iraq from the U.S. throughout the 1980s. Commerce Departments records, disclosed as a result of Iraqgate investigations, confirmed this. The investigations revealed that exports had been approved for military recipients and others involved in military research and development, including the Iraqi Air Force, Iraq’s Ministry of Defense, the Saad General Establishment (missile research), the State Organization for Technical Industries (military production), and al-Qaqaa Stater Establishment (explosives and propellants research and production). 1 Further evidence of this became available after the Persian Gulf war, when U.N. teams inspecting Iraqi sites found U.S. dual-use technology, along with that of other western countries, at facilities involved in Iraq’s nuclear weapons programs.2

Chemical Warfare

Throughout the Iran-Iraq war, the Reagan administration chose to give priority to maintaining U.S.-Iraq relations over concerns about Iraq’s use of chemical warfare. Although Washington regarded the issue as an impediment to expanding the relationship, the U.S. evidently viewed chemical weapons use as, to some extent, a public relations problem for Iraq. The U.S. monitored Iraq’s use of chemical weapons closely. A State Department document from November 1983, for example, refers to Iraq’s "almost daily use of CW" and suggests approaching Baghdad in response.3 Another recommends that the approach occur as soon as possible to avoid "unpleasantly surprising" the Iraqis with "public positions we may have to take on this issue."4 (In March 1984, the U.S. publicly condemned Iraq’s chemical weapons use.) These documents also indicate that the U.S. was aware that Iraq, relying primarily on western technology, had acquired a chemical weapons production facility.


Iraq continued its use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces throughout the war. The issue became more problematic for the Reagan administration, however, in the spring and summer of 1988, when Iraq engaged in chemical attacks against Iraqi Kurds in the village of Halabja and at other locations. As early as September 2, the State Department confirmed an attack against Kurdish insurgents that had taken place on August 25, while a memorandum to the secretary of state commented that "the failure of the international community to mobilize an effective response has lowered the inhibitions on use of these weapons in the region and elsewhere."5 Nevertheless, the Reagan administration opposed congressional efforts to respond by imposing economic sanctions, arguing that they would be contrary to U.S. interests. Among the possible negative results cited were the endangerment of contracts for "massive postwar reconstruction" in Iraq.6 The administration succeeded in blocking the legislation.

Chemical weapons use remained an issue that was contentious but evidently of secondary importance in the U.S.-Iraq relationships, for the Reagan administration. In late December 1988, the State Department prepared a review for Secretary of State George Shultz concerning the possible provision by U.S. of medium-term Eximbank export guarantees. Eximbank had been willing to provide only short-term financing to Iraq, because that country’s deteriorating economic situation, high indebtedness and history of repayment problems made providing medium - or long-term cover too risky. But Richard Murphy of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and Allen Wallis of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs both argued that longer term financing was necessary in order to enable U.S. companies to compete for contracts for Iraq’s post-war reconstruction. They also maintained that this financing would lead to expanded commercial ties, which would in turn result in improved political relations with Iraq’s leadership.

Richard Schifter of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, however, vehemently opposed increasing Iraq’s credit facility only four months after its use of chemical weapons against the Kurds. He described the government of Saddam Hussein as " on e of the most brutal and repressive in the world" adding that "its actions in 1988 outdid its previous performance. They probably constitute the most serious violations of the 1980’s." Measure taken against Kurds "were ordered from the very top, in a cold calculated manner....If the general American public were aware of Iraq’s human rights violations, as it is aware of human rights violations in countries covered more fully by the media, there would indeed be a great public outcry against U.S. assistance to that country. Even though the facts about Iraq’s deplorable human rights record are not generally known, they are known top us and should be taken into full account.>>read%20more">>>>read more

This is quite long reading

by : World Peace SocietyFriday 22nd April 2005

http://bellaciao.org/en/article.php3?id_article=5864