More at Stake in Bolton Nomination Than Meets the Eye
By Ray McGovern t r u t h o u t Perspective
Monday 25 April 2005
President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney are casting the trials of John Bolton, their nominee for ambassador to the U.N., as a partisan political squabble. It is much more than that. It is rather a matter of life and death for the endangered species of intelligence analysts determined to "tell it like it is," no matter what the administration's policies may be. For them the stakes are very high indeed.
The Bush administration strongly resists the notion that the intelligence on Iraq, for example, was cooked to the White House recipe. And with thepresident's party controlling both houses of Congress and the president appointing his own "independent" commission to investigate, Bush and Cheney have until now been able to prevent any meaningful look into the issue of politicization of intelligence.
But the Bolton nomination has brought it very much to the fore, and there will be serious repercussions in the intelligence community if, despite his flagrant attempts to intimidate intelligence analysts, Bolton is confirmed by the Senate.
For many, the term "politicization" is as difficult to understand as it is to pronounce. Indeed, it is impossible to understand, when one assumes, as most do, that all institutions in Washington, DC have a political agenda. Suffice it to say here that, in order to do their job properly, intelligence analysts must at one and the same time be aware of what is going on at the policy level but be insulated from political pressure to conform intelligence to policy. That way, intelligence anlysis can be based on fact (as in "We have no good evidence that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction"), rather than fiction (as in, "Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat requiring immediate action"). Helpful insight into politicization can be found in John Prados' article of last Thursday, "Boltonized Intelligence
L' Affaire Bolton
For those who may have tuned in late, in February 2002 then-Under Secretary of State John Bolton sought intelligence community clearance for his own home-grown analysis regarding Cuba's pursuit of biological weapons and the possibility it might share them with rogue states. (One can only speculate on his purpose in exaggerating the threat.)
Small problem: Bolton's intended remarks went far beyond what U.S. intelligence would support.
Christian Westermnn of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and counterparts from other agencies refused to let Bolton represent his views as those of the intelligence community and proposed instead some alternative, less alarming language. At this Bolton became so dyspeptic that he summoned Westermann to his office for a tongue-lashing and then asked top INR officials to remove him.>>>>continued">>>>>>continued
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/042605J.shtml
By Ray McGovern t r u t h o u t Perspective
Monday 25 April 2005
President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney are casting the trials of John Bolton, their nominee for ambassador to the U.N., as a partisan political squabble. It is much more than that. It is rather a matter of life and death for the endangered species of intelligence analysts determined to "tell it like it is," no matter what the administration's policies may be. For them the stakes are very high indeed.
The Bush administration strongly resists the notion that the intelligence on Iraq, for example, was cooked to the White House recipe. And with thepresident's party controlling both houses of Congress and the president appointing his own "independent" commission to investigate, Bush and Cheney have until now been able to prevent any meaningful look into the issue of politicization of intelligence.
But the Bolton nomination has brought it very much to the fore, and there will be serious repercussions in the intelligence community if, despite his flagrant attempts to intimidate intelligence analysts, Bolton is confirmed by the Senate.
For many, the term "politicization" is as difficult to understand as it is to pronounce. Indeed, it is impossible to understand, when one assumes, as most do, that all institutions in Washington, DC have a political agenda. Suffice it to say here that, in order to do their job properly, intelligence analysts must at one and the same time be aware of what is going on at the policy level but be insulated from political pressure to conform intelligence to policy. That way, intelligence anlysis can be based on fact (as in "We have no good evidence that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction"), rather than fiction (as in, "Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat requiring immediate action"). Helpful insight into politicization can be found in John Prados' article of last Thursday, "Boltonized Intelligence
L' Affaire Bolton
For those who may have tuned in late, in February 2002 then-Under Secretary of State John Bolton sought intelligence community clearance for his own home-grown analysis regarding Cuba's pursuit of biological weapons and the possibility it might share them with rogue states. (One can only speculate on his purpose in exaggerating the threat.)
Small problem: Bolton's intended remarks went far beyond what U.S. intelligence would support.
Christian Westermnn of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and counterparts from other agencies refused to let Bolton represent his views as those of the intelligence community and proposed instead some alternative, less alarming language. At this Bolton became so dyspeptic that he summoned Westermann to his office for a tongue-lashing and then asked top INR officials to remove him.>>>>continued">>>>>>continued
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/042605J.shtml
posted by Kangaroo Brisbane Australia at 6:01 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home