A war full of errors calls for a rethink
Harlan Ullman:
12 September 2005
MUCH of the world wonders why the US and the Bush administration have managed to get Iraq so wrong in so many ways. And it is perplexed that the basis for war - the notion that democratising Iraq would lead to a more peaceful and stable region - was never debated in serious fashion.
A cursory inspection of why the errors and miscalculations took place provides a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the US's capacity as a global leader. Close allies such as Australia have more than a passing interest in these matters, especially as their futures cannot remain unaffected by what the world's remaining superpower does rightly and wrongly.
Consider the impact of culture, ideology and the polarisation of both political parties on US politics today. Fifteen years ago, when the Soviet Union dissolved, a senior Moscow official challenged the US as to what it would do now that the threat had been taken away from it. The point was that the US needed an enemy as a means to overcome the divisive effects of its political system, a system purposely based on divided power and authority to limit any branch of government from becoming too powerful. That is part of the culture that dates back centuries.
Hence, when Manhattan's twin towers collapsed four years ago, the US needed an enemy and the attack was instantly compared to Pearl Harbor. The automatic response was to declare war on the perpetrators, and then on global terror. Yet there was no formal declaration of war and absent that, the President was ceded the authority to take charge and win, whatever that meant. Congress remained supportive and passive, expressing its outrage over the atrocities committed by al-Qa'ida. And four years after 9/11, Congress has been tardy to conduct rigorous oversight of the war on terror and preparations for homeland security, a failing made manifestly clear by the dismal response to the tragic consequences wrought by Hurricane Katrina.
Regarding ideology, there is little new. Vietnam was about paying any price and bearing any burden to preserve freedom. In Iraq, the ideology of the so-called neo-conservatives prevailed. In their view, democracies did not make war on other democracies. The greater Middle East was the largest source of instability and danger. Democracy would change the region. The argument went that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, the Gulf States and Iran would take note and would adjust their policies accordingly and more favourably towards the US. But where to start?
As we know, Iraq became the target. Given this ideology, it made little difference whether or not Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or had any links to September 11. Depose Saddam Hussein, democratise Iraq and the world would be a better place. For President George W. Bush, with no foreign policy experience at that stage, Iraq became a once-in-a-lifetime strategic opportunity.
These same neo-conservatives also believed that once Saddam was gone, Iraqis would be willing and able to grab the reins of power and establish a democratic regime in short order. All that was needed was to lift the horrible yoke of oppression. Thus, thorough post-war planning was deferred. Winning the war was sufficient to win the peace. And there was no debate on these assumptions and aspirations.
This combination of culture and ideology, magnified by the reluctance of the administration to admit error or to change course, has played out over the past 2 1/2 years in Iraq to the extreme detriment of the region as well as the coalition forces occupying Iraq. US democracy is not Iraqi democracy and the profound if not irreconcilable clashes between the needs and aspirations of the various sects and ethnic groups - Shia, Kurd and Sunni - over such matters as the role of religion, division of resources and the power of a central versus provincial governments, suggest the magnitude of the problems.
Finally, politics in the US has become dangerously polarised. Each person's views depend on where they stand ideologically, irrespective of what the facts are or where the truth lies. Note how abortion, religion and gun control are often beyond rational discussion. And that a well-known US theologian, Pat Robertson, could call for the assassination of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is a further indication of the demise of reason in politics. Imagine if a foreign cleric called for the elimination of President Bush.
Because of these reasons, US foreign policy is filled with too many wrong or bad assumptions. If these policies are to succeed, then the flaws in our assumptions must be fixed. Whether or not the Bush administration will attempt that review is the crucial and sadly unanswerable question. But it is one that cannot be ignored.
Harlan Ullman is a senior adviser at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies and the author, most recently, of Finishing Business: Ten Steps to Defeat Global Terror. He is in Australia on a short visit.
12 September 2005
MUCH of the world wonders why the US and the Bush administration have managed to get Iraq so wrong in so many ways. And it is perplexed that the basis for war - the notion that democratising Iraq would lead to a more peaceful and stable region - was never debated in serious fashion.
A cursory inspection of why the errors and miscalculations took place provides a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the US's capacity as a global leader. Close allies such as Australia have more than a passing interest in these matters, especially as their futures cannot remain unaffected by what the world's remaining superpower does rightly and wrongly.
Consider the impact of culture, ideology and the polarisation of both political parties on US politics today. Fifteen years ago, when the Soviet Union dissolved, a senior Moscow official challenged the US as to what it would do now that the threat had been taken away from it. The point was that the US needed an enemy as a means to overcome the divisive effects of its political system, a system purposely based on divided power and authority to limit any branch of government from becoming too powerful. That is part of the culture that dates back centuries.
Hence, when Manhattan's twin towers collapsed four years ago, the US needed an enemy and the attack was instantly compared to Pearl Harbor. The automatic response was to declare war on the perpetrators, and then on global terror. Yet there was no formal declaration of war and absent that, the President was ceded the authority to take charge and win, whatever that meant. Congress remained supportive and passive, expressing its outrage over the atrocities committed by al-Qa'ida. And four years after 9/11, Congress has been tardy to conduct rigorous oversight of the war on terror and preparations for homeland security, a failing made manifestly clear by the dismal response to the tragic consequences wrought by Hurricane Katrina.
Regarding ideology, there is little new. Vietnam was about paying any price and bearing any burden to preserve freedom. In Iraq, the ideology of the so-called neo-conservatives prevailed. In their view, democracies did not make war on other democracies. The greater Middle East was the largest source of instability and danger. Democracy would change the region. The argument went that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, the Gulf States and Iran would take note and would adjust their policies accordingly and more favourably towards the US. But where to start?
As we know, Iraq became the target. Given this ideology, it made little difference whether or not Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or had any links to September 11. Depose Saddam Hussein, democratise Iraq and the world would be a better place. For President George W. Bush, with no foreign policy experience at that stage, Iraq became a once-in-a-lifetime strategic opportunity.
These same neo-conservatives also believed that once Saddam was gone, Iraqis would be willing and able to grab the reins of power and establish a democratic regime in short order. All that was needed was to lift the horrible yoke of oppression. Thus, thorough post-war planning was deferred. Winning the war was sufficient to win the peace. And there was no debate on these assumptions and aspirations.
This combination of culture and ideology, magnified by the reluctance of the administration to admit error or to change course, has played out over the past 2 1/2 years in Iraq to the extreme detriment of the region as well as the coalition forces occupying Iraq. US democracy is not Iraqi democracy and the profound if not irreconcilable clashes between the needs and aspirations of the various sects and ethnic groups - Shia, Kurd and Sunni - over such matters as the role of religion, division of resources and the power of a central versus provincial governments, suggest the magnitude of the problems.
Finally, politics in the US has become dangerously polarised. Each person's views depend on where they stand ideologically, irrespective of what the facts are or where the truth lies. Note how abortion, religion and gun control are often beyond rational discussion. And that a well-known US theologian, Pat Robertson, could call for the assassination of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is a further indication of the demise of reason in politics. Imagine if a foreign cleric called for the elimination of President Bush.
Because of these reasons, US foreign policy is filled with too many wrong or bad assumptions. If these policies are to succeed, then the flaws in our assumptions must be fixed. Whether or not the Bush administration will attempt that review is the crucial and sadly unanswerable question. But it is one that cannot be ignored.
Harlan Ullman is a senior adviser at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies and the author, most recently, of Finishing Business: Ten Steps to Defeat Global Terror. He is in Australia on a short visit.
posted by Kangaroo Brisbane Australia at 3:37 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home