Iran Nukes: U.S. Denial of Reality
The only thing Condi is good for, is to keep the thugs feet warm in bed, and probably not even that .
By Ivan Eland
June 7, 2006
Editor's Note: One of the dangers of invading Iraq after Saddam Hussein let in United Nations weapons inspectors was that it sent a message to other countries facing threats from George W. Bush that cooperation was a game for suckers. Watching the bloody devastation of Iraq and the personal humiliation of Hussein only hardened the determination of leaders in countries like North Korea and Iran not to make the same mistake.
Another negative consequence was the demonstration that American power has limits. Bush and the neoconservatives had thought their unleashing of "shock and awe" would leave the rest of the world quivering in fear, but the American disaster in Iraq has now emboldened U.S. adversaries by showing that even the powerful American military has serious weaknesses.
These two Iraq factors have narrowed U.S. options in facing more serious dangers such as discouraging Iran's nuclear experimentation. In this guest essay, the Independent Institute's Ivan Eland dissects the hard choices ahead for U.S. policy in the Middle East:
The Bush administration is congratulating itself on finally agreeing to direct talks with Iran about Iran’s nuclear program. This smugness shows just how out of touch with reality the administration has become.
The United States and the Europeans joining together to negotiate with Iran merely mirrors the multilateral approach already taken many years ago with North Korea. Unfortunately, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice combined the offer with a blunt and arrogant pronouncement that Iran had a choice between two paths—cooperation or confrontation with the international community.
The Iranians fired back by threatening to disrupt oil supplies if attacked. The Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s leader, said, “If the Americans make a wrong move toward Iran, the shipment of energy will definitely face danger, and the Americans would not be able to protect energy supply in the region.”
Secretary Rice dismissed this threat saying, “I think something like 80 percent of Iran’s budget comes from oil revenue, and so obviously it would be a very serious problem for Iran if oil were disrupted on the market.”
The Ayatollah was implying that Iran could disrupt the world’s oil market by blocking the shipment of much of Persian Gulf oil by making the Strait of Hormuz impassable using its naval forces. Secretary Rice is correct that this would also impede Iranian exports.
But if Iran were attacked, it might absorb this economic pain to inflict punishment on the U.S. and its Western allies. In many past conflicts, belligerents have thrown economic self-interest to the wind when they thought their security was at risk.
Alternatively, any U.S. attack could spur Iran to encourage Shi’ite militias in Iraq to directly attack U.S. forces. Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the most powerful Shi’ite militia leaders, has already pledged to do this if the United States attacks Iran.
This chain of events would lead to the collapse of U.S. policy in Iraq—already hanging by a thread. Right now, the Iranians are supplying and training Shi’ite militias in Iraq, but, unlike the Sunni insurgents, they are not directly attacking U.S. forces. The Shi’ite militias are only attacking Sunnis.
Thus, Iran is stirring the pot in Iraq but has not caused it to boil over. However, if the U.S. attacks Iran, we can expect the Iranians to unleash the Shi’ite militias on U.S. forces in Iraq. In addition, any U.S. attack could also spur Iran to let loose Hezbollah—perhaps the most competent terrorist group in the world—on U.S. targets.
With all of these drawbacks, what would a military strike against Iran over its nuclear program achieve? If the experience of Iraq is any guide, U.S. intelligence most likely does not know where all of Iran’s nuclear facilities are located. Thus, air strikes could only take out some of them and thus slow, rather than eliminate, Iran’s nuclear program.
In fact, knowing that the possession of nuclear weapons is the only thing that could deter another U.S. attack, the Iranians would probably then work over time to get the bomb. >>>cont
Link Here
By Ivan Eland
June 7, 2006
Editor's Note: One of the dangers of invading Iraq after Saddam Hussein let in United Nations weapons inspectors was that it sent a message to other countries facing threats from George W. Bush that cooperation was a game for suckers. Watching the bloody devastation of Iraq and the personal humiliation of Hussein only hardened the determination of leaders in countries like North Korea and Iran not to make the same mistake.
Another negative consequence was the demonstration that American power has limits. Bush and the neoconservatives had thought their unleashing of "shock and awe" would leave the rest of the world quivering in fear, but the American disaster in Iraq has now emboldened U.S. adversaries by showing that even the powerful American military has serious weaknesses.
These two Iraq factors have narrowed U.S. options in facing more serious dangers such as discouraging Iran's nuclear experimentation. In this guest essay, the Independent Institute's Ivan Eland dissects the hard choices ahead for U.S. policy in the Middle East:
The Bush administration is congratulating itself on finally agreeing to direct talks with Iran about Iran’s nuclear program. This smugness shows just how out of touch with reality the administration has become.
The United States and the Europeans joining together to negotiate with Iran merely mirrors the multilateral approach already taken many years ago with North Korea. Unfortunately, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice combined the offer with a blunt and arrogant pronouncement that Iran had a choice between two paths—cooperation or confrontation with the international community.
The Iranians fired back by threatening to disrupt oil supplies if attacked. The Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s leader, said, “If the Americans make a wrong move toward Iran, the shipment of energy will definitely face danger, and the Americans would not be able to protect energy supply in the region.”
Secretary Rice dismissed this threat saying, “I think something like 80 percent of Iran’s budget comes from oil revenue, and so obviously it would be a very serious problem for Iran if oil were disrupted on the market.”
The Ayatollah was implying that Iran could disrupt the world’s oil market by blocking the shipment of much of Persian Gulf oil by making the Strait of Hormuz impassable using its naval forces. Secretary Rice is correct that this would also impede Iranian exports.
But if Iran were attacked, it might absorb this economic pain to inflict punishment on the U.S. and its Western allies. In many past conflicts, belligerents have thrown economic self-interest to the wind when they thought their security was at risk.
Alternatively, any U.S. attack could spur Iran to encourage Shi’ite militias in Iraq to directly attack U.S. forces. Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the most powerful Shi’ite militia leaders, has already pledged to do this if the United States attacks Iran.
This chain of events would lead to the collapse of U.S. policy in Iraq—already hanging by a thread. Right now, the Iranians are supplying and training Shi’ite militias in Iraq, but, unlike the Sunni insurgents, they are not directly attacking U.S. forces. The Shi’ite militias are only attacking Sunnis.
Thus, Iran is stirring the pot in Iraq but has not caused it to boil over. However, if the U.S. attacks Iran, we can expect the Iranians to unleash the Shi’ite militias on U.S. forces in Iraq. In addition, any U.S. attack could also spur Iran to let loose Hezbollah—perhaps the most competent terrorist group in the world—on U.S. targets.
With all of these drawbacks, what would a military strike against Iran over its nuclear program achieve? If the experience of Iraq is any guide, U.S. intelligence most likely does not know where all of Iran’s nuclear facilities are located. Thus, air strikes could only take out some of them and thus slow, rather than eliminate, Iran’s nuclear program.
In fact, knowing that the possession of nuclear weapons is the only thing that could deter another U.S. attack, the Iranians would probably then work over time to get the bomb. >>>cont
Link Here
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