Few Senators Read Iraq NIE Report
By Manu Raju, Elana Schor and Ilan Wurman
June 19, 2007
Only a handful of senators outside the Intelligence Committee say they read the full 92-page National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s ability to attack the U.S. before voting to go to war, according to a survey conducted by The Hill.The low interest in the classified estimate, or NIE, could offer valuable cover to the five senators seeking the presidency who acknowledged during recent debates that they did not read the complete document before the pivotal Iraq vote.
The Hill contacted all 69 sitting senators who voted on the war authorization in the wee hours of Oct. 11, 2002, as well as former senators who did so. Twenty-two senators told The Hill that they read the document before the vote. The offices of 38 senators said they had not read the full report or could not recall, while six senators did not comment. Nine sitting senators and 21 former senators did not return repeated requests for comment (see chart).Despite not reading the assessment, many senators defended their preparation to examine the administration's ultimately debunked portrayal of Iraqi weapons capability.
June 19, 2007
Only a handful of senators outside the Intelligence Committee say they read the full 92-page National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s ability to attack the U.S. before voting to go to war, according to a survey conducted by The Hill.The low interest in the classified estimate, or NIE, could offer valuable cover to the five senators seeking the presidency who acknowledged during recent debates that they did not read the complete document before the pivotal Iraq vote.
The Hill contacted all 69 sitting senators who voted on the war authorization in the wee hours of Oct. 11, 2002, as well as former senators who did so. Twenty-two senators told The Hill that they read the document before the vote. The offices of 38 senators said they had not read the full report or could not recall, while six senators did not comment. Nine sitting senators and 21 former senators did not return repeated requests for comment (see chart).Despite not reading the assessment, many senators defended their preparation to examine the administration's ultimately debunked portrayal of Iraqi weapons capability.
“The NIE does a very nice job of making clear the trajectory that Iraq is on. And that trajectory is straight down.”
Posted on Feb 2, 2007 A declassified version of the long-awaited new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq has gone public. Its findings are grim: It says the term “ ‘civil war’ accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict.” Check out the document (.pdf file).
A key section of the report begins:
Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. If strengthened Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of violence and establish more effective security for Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an opportunity to begin the process of political compromise necessary for longer term stability, political progress, and economic recovery.
Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate.
Read the rest
A key section of the report begins:
Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. If strengthened Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of violence and establish more effective security for Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an opportunity to begin the process of political compromise necessary for longer term stability, political progress, and economic recovery.
Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate.
Read the rest
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