Bush Seeks His Enemies' Help in Iraq
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Monday 16 January 2006
Washington - To avoid failure of its mission in Iraq, the George W. Bush administration has been driven to seek the help of two major enemies - the Sunni insurgents and the government of Iran - but both initiatives have failed to make progress because officials were not given any real negotiating authority.
US officials in Baghdad are now pursuing contacts with both declared enemies, with the aim of obtaining their cooperation in overcoming otherwise seemingly insurmountable obstacles to success in Iraq. In both cases, however, the White House has been unwilling to approve concessions required to reach a deal benefiting both sides.
Administration policymakers have apparently recognised that, without the help of Iran and the Sunni insurgent leaders, it faces the likelihood of spiraling sectarian violence, undiminished Sunni armed resistance, al Qaeda terrorist havens and predominant Iranian political influence.
Some US officials came to realise in 2005 that US policy was leading to consequences that contradicted its larger interests. Its main Iraqi allies, the militant Shiite parties, were aligned with its main enemy, Iran, while US forces were fighting against Sunni insurgent organisations whose longer term interests lay in opposing both al Qaeda and Iran.
Iran held a strong and possibly decisive influence in Iraq because of its close ties with militant Shiite political-military groups. The extent of that influence was driven home last July when Iraq's Defence Minister Saadoun Dulaimi, on a visit to the Iranian capital, discussed possible military cooperation between the two countries, only to back away under US pressure. >>>cont
Monday 16 January 2006
Washington - To avoid failure of its mission in Iraq, the George W. Bush administration has been driven to seek the help of two major enemies - the Sunni insurgents and the government of Iran - but both initiatives have failed to make progress because officials were not given any real negotiating authority.
US officials in Baghdad are now pursuing contacts with both declared enemies, with the aim of obtaining their cooperation in overcoming otherwise seemingly insurmountable obstacles to success in Iraq. In both cases, however, the White House has been unwilling to approve concessions required to reach a deal benefiting both sides.
Administration policymakers have apparently recognised that, without the help of Iran and the Sunni insurgent leaders, it faces the likelihood of spiraling sectarian violence, undiminished Sunni armed resistance, al Qaeda terrorist havens and predominant Iranian political influence.
Some US officials came to realise in 2005 that US policy was leading to consequences that contradicted its larger interests. Its main Iraqi allies, the militant Shiite parties, were aligned with its main enemy, Iran, while US forces were fighting against Sunni insurgent organisations whose longer term interests lay in opposing both al Qaeda and Iran.
Iran held a strong and possibly decisive influence in Iraq because of its close ties with militant Shiite political-military groups. The extent of that influence was driven home last July when Iraq's Defence Minister Saadoun Dulaimi, on a visit to the Iranian capital, discussed possible military cooperation between the two countries, only to back away under US pressure. >>>cont
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